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by Professor Helen E. Hartnell*
Once upon a time, procedural law in all its peculiarity stayed home in the scullery, 
while public and even private law went off  to attend the European integration ball. 
Th e rules of procedural law were seen as quintessentially domestic and inappro-
priate for the European stage. EU Member States were said to possess ‘national 
procedural and remedial autonomy and competence’,¹ and the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) averted its gaze discretely from the stay- at- home sib. In its clas-
sic formulation, the ECJ declared that ‘it is for the domestic legal system of each 
Member State to designate the courts having jurisdiction and to determine the 
procedural conditions governing actions at law intended to ensure the protection 
of the rights which citizens have from the direct eff ect of Community law . . . ’, 
absent ‘Community rules on this subject’.²
Th is mythical vision of the relationship between the EU and the legal orders 
of its Member States has long since vanished, as the glare of the ECJ’s emerging 
Union standards governing the adequacy and eff ectiveness of national procedures 
for the enforcement of Union law gradually dispelled the mists surrounding this 
repository of national sovereignty.³ Parallel to judicial developments, a  growing 
* Golden Gate University School of Law.
¹ P. Craig and G. de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases, and Materials (Oxford University Press, 4th edn 
2008), at 306.
² Case 33/76 Rewe- Zentralfi nanz eG and Rewe- Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für das 
Saarland [1976] ECR 1989, 1997. See also Case 45/76 Comet v. Produktschap [1976] ECR 2043.
³ See, e.g., R. Caranta, ‘Judicial Protection Against Member States: A New Jus Commune Takes 
Shape’ (1995) 32 CMLR 703; W. van Gerven, ‘Bridging the Gap Between Community and National 
Laws: Towards a Principle of Homogeneity in the Field of Legal Remedies?’ (1995) 32 CMLR 679. 
For more extended analyses of these developments, see Craig and de Búrca, note 1 above, at 305–43; 
M. Dougan, National Remedies before the Court of Justice (Hart, 2004); C. Kilpatrick, T. Novitz and 
P. Skidmore (eds), Th e Future of Remedies in Europe (Hart, 2000); J. Lindholm, State Procedure and 
Union Rights (Uppsala: Iustus Förlag, 2007).
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number of Union regulatory measures have appeared that  explicitly address 
remedial concerns alongside substantive ones.⁴ Pan- European procedural stand-
ards have also emerged from Article 6 of the 1950 European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which articulates the 
right to a fair trial.⁵ Last but not least, the incremental movement towards what 
numerous authors label a ‘common European law of procedure’ received an enor-
mous boost from Article 65 of the Treaty of Amsterdam,⁶ which made clear that 
‘private international and civil law procedures just like certain aspects of general 
procedural law are not national domains completely untouched by Community 
law.’⁷
Eva Storskrubb’s book – Civil Procedure and EU Law: A Policy Area Uncovered – 
fast- forwards the reader into the ‘Brave New World’ that has sprung into existence 
in the decade since the Treaty of Amsterdam laid a solid (albeit limited) foundation 
upon which to erect transnational European procedural and private international 
law.⁸ Th is ambitious book, which grew out of the author’s doctoral dissertation 
at the European University Institute, marks an extraordinary contribution to an 
emerging fi eld by a young scholar, and deserves a place in academic as well as prac-
titioner libraries.
Preliminary remarks about scope are unavoidable, since Storskrubb’s book 
carves out an important but awkward slice from one subfi eld of the civil compo-
nent of the EU’s ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’. Th e author’s decision to 
limit her coverage to a fraction of the procedural subset of issues that constitute 
this rapidly emerging fi eld makes perfect sense in a doctoral dissertation, as well 
⁴ One early example in the context of approximation of laws is the fancy footwork around a range 
of procedural and remedial issues found in Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concern-
ing liability for defective products. In recent years, one fi nds a growing number of measures expli-
citly addressing the topic of remedies in regard to a particular sector, such as intellectual property 
(Directive 2004/48/EC), the award of public contracts (Directive 2007/66/EC), and the environ-
ment (Directive 2004/35/EC).
⁵ Today, Article 6 is applied and interpreted primarily by the European Court of Human Rights, 
whereas some decisions in the past were rendered by the European Commission on Human Rights. 
See generally N. Mole and C. Harby, Th e right to a fair trial: A guide to the implementation of Article 
6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Council of Europe, 2006). Article 6 may also be 
applied directly by the courts of some members of the Council of Europe. See, e.g., T. Öhlinger, 
‘Austria and Article 6 of the European Convention’ (1990) 1 EJIL 286.
⁶ Now Article 81 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Th e Lisbon 
Treaty made a number of important changes in regard to civil justice, some of which bear quick men-
tion, even though they are not directly relevant to the analysis of Storskrubb’s book. First, Lisbon 
largely normalized the decision- making procedure in the fi eld of civil justice, although the TFEU 
continues to require unanimity in regard to measures in the fi eld of family law. Second, the fi eld of 
‘judicial cooperation in civil matters’ is no longer subject to special limitations on the power of the 
ECJ. And third, Lisbon eliminated Article 293 (ex 220) EC Treaty entirely, thereby driving the fi nal 
nail into the coffi  n of the tradition of intergovernmental cooperation in the fi eld of civil justice.
⁷ A. Staudinger and S. Leible, ‘Article 65 of the EC Treaty in the EC System of Competencies’ 
(2000/01) 4 European Legal Forum 225–35, at 228.
⁸ Peter Hay has described these fi elds as ‘neighboring vineyards’. R. Freer (2006) ‘Pondering 
the Imponderable and Other Observations from the Intersection of Confl icts and Civil Procedure’ 
Emory University School of Law Public Law & Legal Th eory Research Paper Series No. 06/27, <http://
papers.ssrn.com/abstract=946957>.
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as in the context of demand for titles devoted to new areas of EU law. Yet this 
decision simultaneously undermines the author’s theoretical project and the 
practical usefulness of the book. Th is is not a fatal fl aw; indeed, the book suc-
ceeds remarkably in being both provocative for the academically minded reader 
and informative for the practitioner. But if the title is to fulfi ll its potential 
and become a perennial, then the author would be well- advised to expand the 
book’s coverage to include the full panoply of procedural issues under Article 
81 TFEU (ex 65 EC Treaty), if not the entire scope of this still relatively new 
policy fi eld.
Th e scope of Article 81 TFEU – like its predecessor, Article 65 EC Treaty – is 
bounded by the notoriously imprecise and malleable language ‘judicial cooper-
ation in civil matters having cross- border implications’. Th e open- ended and 
amorphous fi eld opened up by Article 65 EC Treaty was circumscribed by the 
requirement that a measure in this fi eld may only be adopted ‘in so far as necessary 
for the proper functioning of the internal market’. Th e Lisbon Treaty appears to 
have slipped this noose, and Article 81(2) TFEU now provides that the ‘European 
Parliament and the Council . . . shall adopt measures, particularly when necessary for 
the proper functioning of the internal market’ (emphasis added). Th e addition of 
the word ‘particularly’ suggests that necessity is no longer an absolute prerequisite 
to the adoption of legal measures in the fi eld, as it once was, and thus makes it eas-
ier for the Commission to justify exercising its right of initiative in the civil justice 
fi eld.
Th e Lisbon Treaty did not, however, alter the uneasy fi t between the treaty lan-
guage that demarcates the EU’s competence (‘judicial cooperation in civil matters’) 
and the pre- existing labels applied to the diverse issues that have been drawn within 
the scope of EU competence. Th is awkwardness stems in part from disagreement 
among experts about how to characterize particular issues,⁹ but also refl ects the fact 
that both Articles 81 TFEU and 65 EC Treaty explicitly include an array of proce-
dural issues under their respective aegis, but are by no means limited to procedural 
law. Indeed, the bulk of measures communitarized by Article 65 EC Treaty¹⁰ fell 
more comfortably under the label ‘private international law’ – defi ned broadly here 
to encompass not only confl ict of laws but also issues of jurisdiction, recognition 
⁹ For example, some would assign jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judg-
ments to procedure, while others would relegate these topics to private international law.
¹⁰ Article 65 EC Treaty provided that ‘[m]easures in the fi eld of judicial cooperation in civil mat-
ters . . . shall include:
   (a) improving and simplifying:
    — the system for cross- border service of judicial and extrajudicial documents,
     — cooperation in the taking of evidence,
     —  the recognition and enforcement of decisions in civil and commercial cases, including 
decisions in extrajudicial cases;
    (b)  promoting the compatibility of the rules applicable in the Member States concerning the 
confl ict of laws and of jurisdiction;
   (c)  eliminating obstacles to the good functioning of civil proceedings, if necessary by pro-
moting the compatibility of the rules on civil procedure applicable in the Member States.’
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and enforcement of judgments, as well as international judicial assistance.¹¹ For its 
part, the Lisbon Treaty has expanded the foundation laid by Article 65 EC Treaty 
by expressly adding three more arenas to the fi eld of civil justice: eff ective access to 
justice, the development of alternative methods of dispute settlement, and support 
for the training of the judiciary and judicial staff .¹² Th ese new arenas include both 
procedural matters and matters relating to the administration of justice. My aim 
here is not to quibble over labels,¹³ but rather to fl ag the topics elided and suggest 
their relevance to Storskrubb’s overarching project, before proceeding to a more 
systematic presentation and evaluation of her arguments.
Storskrubb limits her analysis to ten of the measures taken pursuant to Article 65 
EC Treaty: service of documents;¹⁴ obtaining evidence; establishing jurisdiction 
and enforcing some types of judgments; enforcement of uncontested claims; legal 
aid; alternative dispute resolution;¹⁵ payment order; small claims procedure; judi-
cial network; and judicial training and other measures. Th ese are important meas-
ures, but so are the topics she omits, namely the EU’s existing (and in some cases 
¹¹ Like procedural law, the topics historically grouped under the labels ‘private international law’ 
or ‘confl ict of laws’ were initially left outside the EU’s Treaty framework. Article 220 of the Treaty 
of Rome directed the Member States ‘so far as necessary, [to] enter into negotiations with each other’ 
in order to secure certain benefi ts for their nationals. Th e 1968 Brussels Convention (later extended 
beyond the boundaries of the EU via the Lugano Convention) was the most important result of such 
eff orts.
¹² Article 81(1) TFEU provides that the EU ‘shall develop judicial cooperation in civil mat-
ters having cross- border implications, based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments 
and of decisions in extrajudicial cases. Such cooperation may include the adoption of measures for 
the approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States’. Article 81(2) adds that the 
‘European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative proced-
ure, shall adopt measures . . . aimed at ensuring: (a) the mutual recognition and enforcement between 
Member States of judgments and of decisions in extrajudicial cases; (b) the cross- border service of 
judicial and extrajudicial documents; (c) the compatibility of the rules applicable in the Member 
States concerning confl ict of laws and of jurisdiction; (d) cooperation in the taking of evidence; (e) 
eff ective access to justice; (f ) the elimination of obstacles to the proper functioning of civil proceed-
ings, if necessary by promoting the compatibility of the rules on civil procedure applicable in the 
Member States; (g) the development of alternative methods of dispute settlement; (h) support for the 
training of the judiciary and judicial staff ’.
¹³ Today the EU institutions tend to use the label ‘civil justice’ to describe this emerging fi eld. I 
coined the term ‘EUstitia’ for this purpose. See H. Hartnell, ‘EUstitia: Institutionalizing Justice in 
the European Union’ (2002) 23 Northwestern J. Int’ l Law & Business 65–138.
¹⁴ Storskrubb’s chapter on service of documents ably discusses the 2000 Regulation, along with 
interpretations by the ECJ, the 2004 study on its operation, and the proposed reforms. However, 
Regulation 1393/2007/EC on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial docu-
ments in civil or commercial matters, and repealing Council Regulation 1348/2000/EC, [2007] OJ 
L 324/79, had not yet been adopted when the book went to press.
¹⁵ At the time the book went to press, Directive 2008/52/EC of 21 May 2008 on certain aspects 
of mediation in civil and commercial matters had not yet been adopted, so Storskrubb discusses the 
legislative process that followed the Commission’s 2004 initial proposal. Aside from the chapter on 
alternative dispute resolution, all other descriptive chapters analyse measures in force.
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ongoing proposals for) specialized rules in the area of insolvency proceedings,¹⁶ 
substantive law,¹⁷ choice of law,¹⁸ family law¹⁹ and succession and wills.²⁰
While Storskrubb can be readily forgiven for hiving off  the huge topic of sub-
stantive private law, which in any case is at best tethered to Article 81 (ex 65) by a 
gossamer thread, it is harder to justify ignoring family law, insolvency, and choice 
of law. Th ese topics are of great practical signifi cance, and are closely related to the 
topics she does cover. Even more, they have inspired some of the liveliest policy 
debates to arise under Article 65 (now 81). For example, the Europeanization of 
¹⁶ See generally J. Israël, European Cross- Border Insolvency Regulation (Intersentia, 2005); P.J. 
Omar, European Insolvency Law (Ashgate, 2004); Wolf- Georg Ringe (2008) ‘Forum Shopping Under 
the EU Insolvency Regulation’ Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 33/2008, <http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstractid=1209822>; M. Virgos and F. Garcimartin, Th e European Insolvency 
Regulation: Law and Practice (Wolters Kluwer, 2004).
¹⁷ At its meeting on 4–5 June 2009, the Justice and Home Aff airs Council adopted detailed 
guidelines on the Common Frame of Reference for European Contract Law. Council Press Release 
10551/09 (Presse 164), at 26–9. Th e Stockholm Programme for 2010- 2014 invited the Commission 
to present a proposal, which it did by its Decision 2010/233/EU of 26 April 2010 setting up the 
expert group on a Common Frame of Reference in the area of European contract law.
¹⁸ Th e most recent measures in this fi eld are Regulation 864/2007 of 11 July 2007 on the law 
applicable to non- contractual obligations (‘Rome II’); Regulation 593/2008 of 17 June 2008 on 
the law applicable to contractual obligations (‘Rome I’); and Regulation 662/2009 of 13 July 2009 
establishing a procedure for the negotiation and conclusion of agreements between Member States 
and third countries on particular matters concerning the law applicable to contractual and non-
 contractual obligations. Meanwhile, the Commission’s 2006 Proposal for a Council Regulation 
amending Regulation 2201/2003 as regards jurisdiction and introducing rules concerning applic-
able law in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility (‘Rome III’) was greeted 
by controversy, and ultimately failed to garner unanimous support in the Council. See generally A. 
Fiorini, ‘Rome III – Choice of Law in Divorce: Is the Europeanization of Family Law Going Too 
Far?’ (2008) 22 Int’l J. of Law, Policy & the Family 178–205; ‘Justice and Home Aff airs: MEPs 
Favour Rome III Regulation on Divorce’ European Report (17 September 2008).
 Not to be deterred, ten Member States informed the Commission in 2008 and 2009 that they 
wished to establish enhanced cooperation among themselves in the area of applicable law in matri-
monial matters. Th e Commission obliged them in March 2010 by presenting a Proposal for a Council 
Regulation implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal 
separation, COM(2010) 105 fi nal. On 12 July 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/405/EU 
authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation, 
making this the fi rst case of ‘enhanced cooperation’ in EU history.
¹⁹ Th e EU’s key measures in the fi eld of family law include (1) Council Regulation 2201/2003 
of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility (‘Brussels II bis’), which repealed 
Regulation 1347/2000 (‘Brussels II’), and (2) Regulation 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdic-
tion, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to 
maintenance obligations. Th e Rome III regulation (noted in note 18 above) would also have altered 
the rules (currently found in Brussels IIbis) on jurisdiction in matrimonial matters and matters of 
parental responsibility. Finally, the EU has moved ahead to conclude agreements with third coun-
tries in the fi eld of family law. See Regulation 664/2009 of 7 July 2009 establishing a procedure 
for the negotiation and conclusion of agreements between Member States and third countries con-
cerning jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of judgments and decisions in matrimonial mat-
ters, matters of parental responsibility and matters relating to maintenance obligations, and the law 
applicable to matters relating to maintenance obligations.
²⁰ In October 2009, the Commission presented its Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of deci-
sions and authentic instruments in matters of succession and the creation of a European Certifi cate 
of Succession, COM(2009)154 fi nal.
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family law has received sustained critical attention, alongside the ‘bandwagon’ (i.e. 
pro- Europeanization) literature,²¹ while the Rome I Regulation on the law appli-
cable to contractual obligations set off  a fi restorm among French academics.²² Any 
eff ort to uncover the policy area implicated by Article 81 TFEU (ex 65 EC Treaty) 
is incomplete if it sidesteps these occasionally searing debates.
And yet, despite these limitations, Storskrubb does a great service by bringing 
many dimensions of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) into 
the limelight. After years of being largely overlooked by the bulk of publications 
that examined the AFSJ (or before that, the Th ird Pillar) as such,²³ the author does 
more than just bring this Cinderella topic to the ball, which in itself is cause to 
rejoice. Storskrubb also gives civil justice a spin around the dance fl oor with the 
Prince – with apologies to Machiavelli – by exploring in some depth the policy 
implications of this emerging fi eld.
Storskrubb’s approach to this complex fi eld is clear, as are her stated goals. Th e 
book consists of two sets of overarching chapters,²⁴ which bracket ten detailed 
²¹ See, e.g., M. Antokolskaia (ed.), Convergence and Divergence of Family Law in Europe 
(Intersentia, 2007); D. Bradley, ‘A Family Law for Europe? Sovereignty, Political Economy and 
Legitimation’ (2004) 4(1) Global Jurist Frontiers, art. 3; K. Boele- Woelki, Brussels II bis: Its Impact 
and its Application in the Member States (Intersentia, 2007); C. McGlynn, Families and the European 
Union: Law, Politics and Pluralism (Cambridge University Press, 2006); J. Meeusen, M. Pertegás, 
G. Straetmans and F. Swennen (eds), International Family Law of the European Union (Intersentia, 
2007); H. Stalford, ‘Regulating family life in post- Amsterdam Europe’ (2003) 28 European Law 
Review 39–52. See also Th e Law Society of Scotland (2008) ‘Freedom, security and justice: what will 
be the future? European commission consultation on priorities for the next fi ve years (2010–2014)’, 
<http://www.lawscot.org.uk>.
²² See V. Heuzé, ‘Lettre ouverte au Président de la République’ (2006) JCP G, act. 586 (signed 
by 39 other law professors); P. Lagarde, H. Gaudemet- Tallon and C. Kessedjian ‘Observations sur la 
lettre ouverte au président de la République intitulée “L’Union européenne, la démocratie et l’État de 
droit”’ (2007) JCP G, act. 18 (signed by 74 other law professors).
²³ I do not mean to equate these civil procedural issues with the more politically salient issues 
that the Treaty of Amsterdam added as Article IV EC Treaty – notably visas, asylum, immigration, 
and other matters related to the free movement of persons – or with the EU’s expanding activities 
in the fi eld of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Still, the issues covered by Article 
81 (ex 65) are not value- neutral, and have signifi cant social and politico- economic implications. In 
this sense, I wish to argue that they deserve more attention than they received in the fi rst wave of 
leading books and symposia on the AFSJ as such. Compare S. Peers, EU justice and home aff airs law 
(Longman, 1st edn 2000) with S. Peers, EU justice and home aff airs law (Oxford University Press, 
2nd edn 2006) (the author notes that the second edition is three times as long and only carries for-
ward about 5% of the original text; both mentioned civil cooperation, but neither provides in- depth 
coverage). Th e European Law Journal devoted vol. 10(2) to Article IV EC Treaty in 2004, but no art-
icle in that issue analyses civil justice. See also R. Bieber and J. Monar (eds), Justice and Home Aff airs 
in the European Union: Th e Development of the Th ird Pillar (European Interuniversity Press, 1995) 
(out of 23 chapters, the barest mention of civil justice in a 6- page chapter); N. Walker (ed.), Europe’s 
Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (Oxford University Press, 2004) (no discussion of civil justice). 
Naturally one can fi nd substantial discussion of the civil justice issues in specialized journals devoted 
to procedural and private international law. For recent book- length treatments see M. Bogdan, 
Concise Introduction to EU Private International Law (Europa Law Publishing, 2006); A. Jokela, 
L. Ervo and M. Gräns (eds), Europeanization of Procedural Law and the New Challenges to Fair Trial 
(Europa Law Publishing, 2009); and P. Stone, EU Private International Law: Harmonization of Laws 
(Edward Elgar, 2006).
²⁴ Chapters 1–5 lay out the author’s basic analytical framework and the background of develop-
ments pursuant to Article 65, while chapters 16 and 17 contain her conclusions about the ‘legitimacy 
of the policy area’ and discuss the way forward.
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chapters in which the author describes and analyses each of the measures (listed 
above) individually. Th e book also boasts numerous appendices that contain the 
texts of the specifi c measures analysed and a few key EU policy documents, as well 
as an extensive bibliography. As such, the book provides an excellent starting point 
for anyone interested in Article 81 TFEU (ex 65 EC Treaty). It is detailed and accu-
rate enough to bring any reader up to speed quickly,²⁵ and is endowed with enough 
historical, statutory and academic resources to provide all readers with confi dent 
guidance for future research. Th at particular audiences – practitioners, academics, 
policy- makers – might wish for more is not so much a weakness of this particular 
book as it is a limitation of the book form itself, particularly in such a fast- moving 
fi eld.
In addition to its dogged thoroughness, Storskrubb’s book has a number of 
strengths. Th e book is meticulously well- organized, which allows the reader to 
follow a long path through complex materials without ever having the sense of 
being lost. Th e book is readable and well edited, and the author makes outstand-
ing use of French, Swedish and Finnish language sources, in addition to the ubi-
quitous English. Th e Nordic contributions are particularly intriguing, notably 
her discussion (pp. 295–301) of theories about the functions of procedure and 
her remark (pp. 11–12) that ‘legal cooperation in civil matters’ is a more accurate 
translation of the terminology found in the Finnish and Swedish texts²⁶ than the 
more limited ‘judicial cooperation’ found in English. I wish that the Nordic litera-
ture – indicated by her citations to works by Knuts, Lindell, Ervasti, Lindblom and 
Virolainen – were available in more widely accessible languages, but it suffi  ces here 
to appreciate Storskrubb’s enrichment of the comparative debate.
Storskrubb aims to provide a ‘holistic evaluation’ of the policy fi eld. Th is she 
achieves ably, subject to the scope limitations noted above and the methodologi-
cal reservations expressed below. Her analysis of the particulars is not only precise 
and detailed, but also contextualized, insofar as she links her micro- level analysis 
to macro policy debates and themes in European integration. Finally, Storskrubb 
explore the broader implications of this emerging fi eld, and off ers a wealth of 
insights, arguments, and critiques, along with constructive suggestions for the way 
forward.
In discussing each of the ten measures, Storskrubb follows a standard template: 
fi rst legislative history, followed by substantive content, and fi nally the norma-
tive implications. Her concise analyses of content are in many respects original, 
and combine close textual analysis with analysis of relevant case law, if any, and 
key underlying debates. She does an excellent job of presenting both sides of the 
issues, although some chapters (e.g. service of documents) are stronger than others 
(e.g. evidence).²⁷ Overall, the author demonstrates not only a high level of skill at 
handling a countless array of technical issues, but also a fi erce commitment to fac-
²⁵ Th e book covers developments through to 31 August 2007.
²⁶ Th e terms ‘rättsligt samarbete’ and ‘oikeudellinen yhteistyö ’ are used in Swedish and in Finnish 
respectively.
²⁷ Th is occasional unevenness appears linked to the presence or absence of academic commentary 
upon which her highly synthetic analysis draws.
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ing diffi  cult issues head- on, rather than steering a safe middle course. In short, the 
book suffi  ces as, but also surpasses what one would expect to fi nd in a practitioners’ 
manual.
In terms of context, Storskrubb provides a multi- faceted and nuanced discussion 
of institutional and structural features of the EU fi eld (chapter 4). Her analyses of 
the problems surrounding Article 68, preliminary reference, and the evolution of 
the Commission’s role are particularly good. She provides a basic but serviceable 
overview of the ECHR and the Charter (pp. 85–6, 200) and the tensions sur-
rounding their relationships to the emerging EU fi eld of civil justice, and notes 
parallel developments in the domestic context (pp. 284–89) and in the fi eld of 
international civil procedure (pp. 289–95). However, her analysis of these broader 
contextual issues is sketchy, and a more searching examination of their relation-
ship to EU developments would be welcome. If these questions get short shrift, it is 
because Storskrubb is more concerned to explore the meaning of the EU develop-
ments themselves.
Th e book enriches discussions about EU civil justice – or, in her narrower ter-
minology, procedural law – by linking the topic to broader theoretical and policy 
debates on integration, including subsidiarity, proportionality, and governance. 
Th e author’s analysis of citizenship and its relationship to civil justice builds on 
a competent (if not comprehensive) synthesis of legal and political science litera-
ture of citizenship, and is one of the strongest interdisciplinary contributions of 
the book. By promoting the realization of rights in practice, civil procedure is a 
practical tool that ‘might in fact provide the true core for creating the justice facet 
of the civil part of citizenship in Europe’ more eff ectively than ‘bland policy state-
ments’ (p. 86).
Storskrubb is at her best when writing about the ‘European Judicial Network’ 
(chapter 14) and about ‘Judicial Training and Other Measures’ (chapter 15). Th ese 
truly interdisciplinary chapters build admirably on early work exploring the 
broader signifi cance of these developments using new institutional theory.²⁸ She 
bucks the common tendency to ignore these ‘soft’ institutional measures when 
writing about developments pursuant to Article 65, and grasps their transforma-
tive potential. Storskrubb rightly sees these ‘holistic’ structural innovations as the 
key to the success of the European Judicial Area: they are ‘not an adjunct to the 
[specifi c single practical measures] or a further step on the road, but . . . an impor-
tant preceding step to make the policy fi eld work eff ectively’ (p. 253). Th us, not-
withstanding the decentralization that characterizes measures in the fi eld, these 
innovations paradoxically Europeanize Member State courts by establishing new 
organized fora in which European discourse and policy coordination will occur, 
and constitute an ‘institutional shift from the purely national to the supranational 
level’ (p. 239). Th ese new cooperative structures, despite their stated goal of serv-
ing as a mechanism to foster diversity, off er ‘several incentives for convergence in 
a process which creates trust and cooperative orientations among participants and 
encourages learning dynamics’ (pp. 239–40). Storskrubb argues that they ‘resem-
²⁸ See Hartnell (2002), note 13 above, at pp. 112–38.
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ble the centralization features of the comitology system’ and are tantamount to 
‘new governance in procedural law’ (p. 240). Moreover, the European Judicial 
Training Network, where the aim of creating European judicial culture has been 
most explicit, has the potential to overcome ‘insurmountable obstacles’ rooted in 
‘the diverse organization of justice in the Member States and the ideological antag-
onisms between procedural systems’ (p. 252).²⁹
Storskrubb’s chapters on the European Judicial Network and the European 
Judicial Training Network do more than just join a transdisciplinary discussion 
about integration. Th ey also articulate a forceful critique of the weaknesses in the 
structure as it currently exists – i.e. its participatory defi ciency and lack of open-
ness – and off er explicit recommendations for overcoming them (p. 244–5). Th e 
author not only encourages more participation by stakeholders, but recommends 
expanding the European Judicial Network into a ‘general coordinating structure 
for civil procedural regulation,’ so that it may become a ‘real tool for building a 
genuine European area of justice’ (p. 245).
As this conclusion suggests, Storskrubb embraces the project of building the 
European Judicial Area. Th is does not mean, however, that she greets develop-
ments uncritically. Her overall approach is to take this new policy area as a given 
and then seek to perfect it, rather than extending her critique to the decision to 
Europeanize civil justice in the fi rst place.³⁰ After laying out a detailed diagno-
sis, the author makes numerous concrete suggestions for improvement. While 
Storskrubb’s argument is complex and at times diffi  cult to unravel, the diligent 
reader will be rewarded by her fi nal chapters, which pull the threads together.
Storskrubb’s ‘holistic’ approach proceeds by assessing the ‘functionality’ (or 
eff ectiveness) and the ‘legitimacy’ of the policy area. Given her premise that ‘func-
tionality is the key to legitimacy’ (p. 301) and her meticulous identifi cation of fl aws 
that impede functionality, it comes as no surprise that the author’s conclusions 
are negative and indicative of a ‘legitimacy crisis’ (p. 304). Storskrubb especially 
bemoans the ‘ideological or visionary weakness’ in the policy fi eld (p. 302), which 
leads to an overemphasis on ‘purely negative’ forms of integration and on market 
values such as effi  ciency, at the expense of other values also implicit in the proce-
dural fi eld.
Despite the author’s warm embrace of many of the principal characteristics of 
the new policy area,³¹ her preliminary conclusion is that the current system is rid-
dled with ‘dark characteristics’ (p. 262) that threaten the success of the EU’s civil 
²⁹ Here Storskrubb borrows an apt analogy to technological hardware and software from 
K. Kerameus, ‘Procédure civile nationale et exigences communautaires’ in M. Bandrac et al. (eds), 
Justice et droits fondamentaux. Etudes off ertes à Jacques Normand (Litec, 2003), pp. 253–9, at 256–7 
(observing that the upgrading of software can sometimes be prevented by older hardware).
³⁰ As explored further below, the author’s approach to the desirability of the new policy area is 
prospective rather than retroactive, insofar as she notes that ‘once there is at least the beginning of a 
truly European judicial space, it is pertinent to consider its eff ects and whether or in which direction 
we support its further development, i.e. to discuss its appropriateness’ (p. 271).
³¹ In particular, she welcomes the trend towards decentralization and the establishment of direct 
cross- border cooperative channels; the concomitant abolition (or streamlining) of the traditional 
diplomatic mechanisms found in international civil procedure; the eff orts to avoid delay, simplify 
procedural mechanisms and improve access to justice; the introduction of minimum standards and 
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justice policy area.³² Notably, the decentralization that characterizes most of the 
measures appears destined to produce further diversity (discriminatory treatment) 
and fragmentation (incoherence), given the diff erent levels of court resources and 
ability prevailing in the Member States and the overall complexity of the new rules 
(pp. 262–3). Storskrubb concludes that ‘transparency, simplicity and legal cer-
tainty’ will be diffi  cult to achieve, and sees ‘the potential for abuse and injustice’ 
that threaten to curtail defendants’ rights (p. 263). Th ese fl aws were magnifi ed by 
the limits imposed on the use of the preliminary reference procedure in this policy 
area (pp. 264–5), i.e. only courts from which there is no appeal could refer ques-
tions to the ECJ under Article 68 EC Treaty.³³
In her prospective exploration of the appropriateness of further development of 
the policy area (pp. 272–84), Storskrubb neatly fi ngers the dilemma that bedevils 
the fi eld and threatens to hamstring progress toward achieving EUstitia. In the 
cautious regulatory atmosphere that has emerged in the EU since the ECJ’s 2000 
decision in the Tobacco Advertising case,³⁴ the author sees a ‘constitutional conun-
drum’ surrounding further incursions into national regulatory autonomy in the 
fi eld of civil justice, which appears most overtly in contests over interpretation of 
the crucial language ‘matters having cross- border implications’ found in Article 81 
(ex 65). Th is situation tends to ‘weaken the drive of the policy area and . . . its practi-
cal implementation, thereby impacting negatively on legitimacy’ (p. 283). Given 
her assessment that the policy area is both fl awed and incomplete, Storskrubb fears 
that any general reluctance to forge ahead will stunt needed growth.
Rather than being discouraged by her negative assessments, Storskrubb off ers 
concrete prescriptions. First, she urges a move away from ‘mere negative’ and 
towards more positive integration (pp. 283, 304–5). She argues that effi  ciency 
must not be the only goal, and proposes to enrich the EU’s vision by attending to 
the social functions of procedure.³⁵ Second, to temper the introduction of mutual 
the principle of mutual recognition; and the introduction of techniques that promote transparency, 
such as the duty to cooperate and share information (pp. 260–1).
³² She also identifi es a number of missing pieces needed to complete the policy area, including 
procedural sanctions, enforcement procedures, interim remedies, and measures pertaining to the 
transparency of the debtor’s assets (pp. 265–6). Along these lines, the Commission presented a Green 
Paper on improving the effi  ciency of the enforcement of judgments in the EU: Th e Attachment of 
Bank Accounts, COM(2006) 618. A proposal for a Regulation on a European system for the attach-
ment of bank accounts is planned for late 2010.
³³ Article 68(1) EC Treaty, which was deleted by the Lisbon Treaty, provided: ‘Article 234 [EC 
Treaty, now Article 267 TFEU] shall apply to [Title IV EC Treaty] under the following circum-
stances and conditions: where a question on the interpretation of this title or on the validity or inter-
pretation of acts of the institutions of the Community based on this title is raised in a case pending 
before a court or a tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy 
under national law, that court or tribunal shall, if it considers that a decision on the question is neces-
sary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.’
³⁴ Case C- 376/98 Federal Republic of Germany v European Parliament and Council of the European 
Union [2000] ECR I- 8419.
³⁵ ‘Th e function of dignity and participation, as well as the political legal debate function, under-
score procedural human rights and the importance of the adversarial process itself in upholding cer-
tain values and resolving disputes in a larger sense than just the case at hand. Th ese concerns as well 
as a more searching concern for consumers of the civil justice system are reinforced in the therapeutic 
function’ (p. 302).
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recognition – which entails the abolition of exequator and some limits on using 
the ordre public defence – she insists that minimum procedural guarantees must 
be set in order to foster mutual trust, which is the sine qua non of the European 
Judicial Area. In particular, she calls for ‘harmonization of rights of the defence 
or centralization’ to address the challenges facing litigants in cases having cross-
 border implications (p. 309). Th ird, Storskrubb proposes a ‘consolidation strategy’ 
aimed at counteracting fragmentation and improving coherence in the policy area 
(pp. 305–7).³⁶ And fi nally, the author notes that EU developments are not taking 
place in a vacuum, and suggests that global regulation might be more appropriate 
than ‘solely Eurocentric’ measures (pp. 284–302, 311). While one might quibble 
with the viability of these proposals, the author makes a strong case for each of 
them, and deserves to be read seriously.
While it is impossible to do justice here to the subtlety and comprehensiveness of 
Storskrubb’s analysis, I have sought to summarize her key arguments and identify 
her major contributions. My remaining task is to off er some critical perspectives 
on this ambitious and largely successful book. Below I explore three problematic 
issues, all of which have a methodological slant and are thus potentially of gen-
eral interest, insofar as they are endemic to much legal writing about European 
integration.
Th e fi rst problem relates to the matter of voice. In a work that aims to provide 
‘normative’ assessments relating to the ‘legitimacy’ of a policy area, it is incumbent 
upon the author to explicate the criteria upon which her judgments rest. In many 
instances, this author applauds a decision by the ECJ (pp. 105–7), or describes 
some ‘very welcome’ reform (p. 125) or innovation (p. 141), without hinting at the 
criteria that undergird her opinion. While these do become more apparent in the 
fi nal chapters of the book (p. 279 ff .), the reader wishes to know earlier on why the 
author stakes out particular positions. Th is problem is accentuated by the highly 
synthetic nature of Storskrubb’s chapters analysing individual measures. In numer-
ous instances, the reader cannot tell if the author is expressing her own views, or 
paraphrasing arguments advanced by EU institutions or other scholars.³⁷
Th e second problem is potentially more troubling. Th e book contains numer-
ous assertions that lack supporting evidence or argument. While this is common 
in legal scholarship, one wishes for more in a work that proclaims its historical 
and interdisiplinary ambitions. To be fair, Storskrubb’s main goals are analytical 
and normative rather than causal or historical. Still, her frequent resort to the lan-
guage of causality had me lurching like a Pavlovian dog in repeated vain attempts 
to sniff  out the foundation of her claims.³⁸ In some cases, the author’s language is 
puzzling and leads the reader to wonder what (if any) argument hides below the 
³⁶ In this context, the author notes ‘an interesting proposal to secure coherence and further 
transparency . . . , namely to consolidate the various measures into a ‘code’, which might counter the 
piecemeal nature of the numerous existing legislative measures and . . . be more accessible to users’ 
(p. 306).
³⁷ For example, the author’s assertion that the ‘business community should be off ered some degree 
of legal certainty’ (p. 145) disorients the reader, who wonders who is speaking.
³⁸ I am peculiarly susceptible to the stimulus of causal language, since my current research 
focuses on explaining how Article 65 and the Tampere program came about. See H.E. Hartnell 
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surface, such as where she notes the ‘historical coincidence between the genesis 
of Union citizenship and judicial cooperation in civil matters’ (p. 83), or where 
she observes that ‘supranational rules within the EU are not the only emanation 
of international procedural development that mirrors the trends and themes of 
domestic procedural reform’ (p. 289). Both of these statements hint at some rela-
tionship among events beyond sheer coincidence, but stop short of exploring what 
they might be.³⁹
Th is second problem appears harmless in some instances, but becomes serious 
in others. For example, Storskrubb’s failure to look more deeply into the relation-
ship between developments in the EU and those in the framework of the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law casts a shadow over her recommendation 
that regulation at the international level might be more appropriate than at the 
regional level (e.g. pp. 301, 310). However welcome her recommendation may be, 
it begs the question whether diffi  culties encountered in the Hague framework may 
be causally related to the decision to communitarize civil justice issues in the fi rst 
place.
Even more troubling is the use of causal language without explicating the under-
lying argument. In one instance, Storskrubb asserts that certain policy concerns 
‘no doubt infl uence the Community institutions’ (p. 135) and that the ‘principle 
of judicial protection elaborated by the Court of Justice . . . precipitated’ the emer-
gence of the new policy fi eld (p. 309), while elsewhere she speculates that the White 
Paper on Governance may have infl uenced the (chronologically prior) European 
Judicial Network (p. 238). Although rarely necessary to her overall analysis, such 
statements raise diffi  cult questions that are of great concern to many – particularly 
social scientists and historians – who seek a deeper and more precise understanding 
of the process of European integration. Overall, these feints lead to a quasi- causal 
mode of analysis that makes it impossible to challenge her assertions and impedes 
transdisciplinary communication.
Many legal scholars write solely for their own discipline, but this, I believe, is less 
viable in the fi eld of European studies, where some issues – such as the institutional 
implications of Europeanized civil justice – are also relevant for scholars outside 
the narrow confi nes of legal discourse. In such cases, legal scholars should make a 
greater eff ort to build bridges to facilitate transdisciplinary communication. One 
step in this direction would be to refrain from using causal language, unless we 
intend to follow through and make the argument.
‘Institutionalizing Civil Justice in the EU: Legal Elites and Ideologies in Transnational Governance’ 
(forthcoming).
³⁹ To be fair, the author does press a bit further in regard to the fi rst of these assertions. In con-
nection with parallel reforms of domestic civil procedure taking place in some EU countries (pp. 
284–9), she claims that there is a ‘clear interaction, which at fi rst was only one- way, with domestic 
trends being carried over to the supranational level’ (p. 289). While it may in fact be true that the 
EU is parroting Member State developments, Storskrubb does not provide enough background or 
historical data to back up her argument. Worse, two of the examples she cites – domestic civil pro-
cedure reform in Austria and Germany – postdate developments at EU level, which cast doubt upon 
her claim.
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My third and fi nal quibble pertains to another technique for building bridges 
that could facilitate transdisciplinary communication and avoid unnecessary 
confusion. Caution is needed when using terms – like ‘Rosebud’ – that appear 
innocuous but are in play and freighted with meaning. For example, Storskrubb 
mentions ‘spillover’ often, but her meaning is not always clear. In some cases, she 
is referring to the spread of innovations from the EU to the Member States,⁴⁰ but 
elsewhere her meaning is less obvious.⁴¹ What is clear, however, is that she does 
not use the term to mean expansion of tasks within the EU from one policy fi eld 
to another, as the term has been used in political science literature commencing 
with Haas.⁴² My aim here is not to insist that one usage is correct and the other 
incorrect, but rather to suggest that such concepts are loaded and should be used 
to build channels of communication between – rather than impermeable walls 
around – disciplinary discourses. To take another terminological example, the 
concept of ‘legitimacy’ is vital to Storskrubb’s analysis, as it is to broader debates 
about democracy in the Union. Her frequent invocation of the term leads the 
reader to wonder fi rst, how she would know legitimacy when she sees it, and sec-
ond, whether there is any common ground between what she has in mind and 
broader academic debates on this topic. At one point, the author argues that the 
harmony between developments in Member States and the EU ‘undoubtedly 
increases the political legitimacy and acceptance of supranational action’ (p. 301), 
but this is a claim that calls at the very least for further explication, if not for 
empirical evidence as well.
To conclude, I neither disdain⁴³ nor argue for abandoning the traditional enter-
prise of legal scholarship. But I do believe that legal scholars can (and should) play 
a larger role in discussions about European integration and globalization, and that 
enhanced dialogue based on a two- way conversation across disciplinary boundar-
ies is desirable. Just imagine how much richer political science literature would be 
if scholars in that discipline had a deeper appreciation for the nuances of the EU’s 
legal system.
⁴⁰ For example, she notes that ‘with the rapid expansion of the policy area, [the EU] may speed 
ahead of domestic reform processes and become the source for the domestic level of the goals of sim-
plifi cation and procedural economy and may create spillover potential in the aims as well as in the 
elaborated rules’ (pp. 288–9; see also p. 185).
⁴¹ For example, she uses the term to characterize Denmark’s belated agreement to participate in 
some of the civil justice measures (p. 274).
⁴² E.B. Haas, Th e Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces 1950- 1957 (Stanford 
University Press, 1958).
⁴³ See A. Arnull ‘Th e Americanization of EU Law Scholarship’ in A. Arnull, P. Eeckhout and 
T. Tridimas (eds), Continuity and Change in EU Law: Essays in Honour of Sir Francis Jacobs (Oxford 
University Press, 2008), pp. 415–30.
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